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My project in this paper is to provide a plausible idea of Christ’s suffering and death in 
terms of a theory of the human person.  More specifically, I want to contrast two major theories 
of the person-body relation.  One is dualism.  Dualism is the view that a human person is 
composed of two substances, that is, a soul and a body, and he (strictly speaking) is identical with 
the soul.  On the other hand, physicalism is the view that a human person is numerically identical 
with his biological body.   In this paper, I argue that dualism is not successful in explaining 
Christ’s passion for some reasons.  Rather, physicalism, as I shall argue, provides a better 
explanation of how Christ’s physical suffering and death are real just like everyone else’s, so it is 
philosophically and theologically more plausible than dualism. 
Dualist Views of the Passion of the Christ 
 There are two Christological theories dualists can choose.1  On the first view, God the 
Son became a human soul when he was embodied.  It says that Christ was composed of a human 
                                                            
1 There are two kinds of substance dualism.  One is Platonist dualism, according to which a soul 
has a body or it is related to a physical body in a certain causal relation just like a pilot in a ship.  
The other type of dualism is often called ‘compound dualism,’ according to which a person is a 
whole composed of a soul and a body.  Augustine held this kind of dualism: “A man is not a body 
alone, nor a soul, but a being composed of both.” (City of God, ch.24, par.2).  Descartes arguably 
was a compound dualist too: “For these sensations of hunger, thirst, pain and so on are nothing 
but confused modes of thinking which arise from the union and, as it were, intermingling of the 
mind with the body.”  Meditations VI, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol.2, trans J. 
Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 56.  
The compound dualist says that two substances are united with each other, and eventually he is 
that soul in that the substantial soul is responsible for the person’s mental life.  For the purpose of 
this paper, I do not make a distinction betw en the traditional substance dualism and compound 
dualism.  For a critique of compound dualism, see Eric Olson, “A Compound of Two 
Substances,” in Soul, Body, and Survival, ed. Kevin Corcoran.  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2001).  And a recent critique of dualism for the so-called ‘paring problem,’ see Jaegwon Kim, 
“Lonely Souls: Causality and Substance Dualism,” in the same volume.   
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soul and a human body.  I will call this view the uman soul view (HSV).  On the second view, in 
the Incarnation, God the Son’s divine soul took the place of a human soul.  That is, Christ was 
composed of a divine soul and a human body, and the ivine soul was the same soul before the 
Incarnation.  I will call this view the divine soul view (DSV).   
 I first want to criticize DSV.  The theory claims that Christ was a divine soul having a 
human body.  But by definition and tradition, the divine soul cannot experience physical pain, and 
it cannot die.2  Dualists could argue that Christ did suffer when a certain physical state of his 
body caused the divine soul to feel pain.  But I would reply that whether there is a causal relation 
between the soul and its body does not ma ter.  My point is whether the divine soul felt pain and 
died.  If Christ, God the Son, was a divine soul, it is hard to understand what it is like that he 
suffered and died.  So long as the soul was divine, as he was before the Incarnation, his pain and 
death could not be like ours.  So DSV does not offer a good explanation of Jesus’ suffering and 
death.3 
 A more popular dualist Christology is HSV.  According to HSV, Jesus’ psychological 
nature as well as his physical nature was entirely human.  It seems to explain how his suffering 
and death were real just like any other human bei gs’ given that the dualist view of the human 
person is right.  So HSV seems to provide a good explanation of Christ’s humanity and his 
physical suffering.   
                                                            
2 According to Christian tradition, God is divinely impassible.  That is to say, God does not 
change or suffer.  Events in the world cannot affect God in any way.  If this tradition is right, 
DSV is untenable, if it says that Jesus, God the Son,suffered and died.  If the divine soul suffered 
and died, soul was not divine according to thatr dition.  Perhaps liberation theologians and 
supporters of open theism would deny the Christian tradition.  Discussion of such theories is 
beyond the scope of the purpose of this paper, so I hope I will discuss them in another place.  
3 DSV was condemned as a heretical idea (called Apollinarianism) at the First Council of 
Constantinople in 381. 
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 Although this view seems attractive for that reason, it is not a good Christological theory.  
It is worth noting that the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation says that Christ had two natures in 
one person.4  On the orthodox doctrine, Christ was fully divine and fully human.  Now HSV says 
that God the Son became a human soul and had a um n body, so he was fully human.  But on 
this view, where is Christ’s divinity?  HSV, as I shall argue, cannot answer the question.   
On dualism, a human person’s essence not only contains but is soul.5  That is, what 
makes a being a human person is a human soul; if something has a human soul, it is essentially a 
human person.  If a human person did not have a soul, he could not exist, since according to 
dualism, he is that soul; he is numerically identical to the soul.  With this in mind, let’s look at the 
current dualist Christology.  If God the Son became a human soul, he was fully human.  But it 
appears hard to say that he was fully divine as well, since by becoming a human soul he, HSV 
must say, lost his essential properties for being divine.  On HSV, Christ was a divine soul before 
the Incarnation, but he became a human being by becoming a human soul.  Obviously, a human 
soul is qualitatively different from a divine soul.  So if God the Son became a human soul, he 
                                                            
4 So the Definition of Chalcedon says:  
“[O]ne and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only begotten, recognized in two natures, without 
confusion, without division, without separation; the distinction of natures being in no way 
annulled by the union, but rather the characteris ics of each nature being preserved and 
coming together to form one person and subsistence, not as parted or separated into two 
persons, but one and the same Son and Only-begotten God the Word, Lord Jesus 
Christ.”4 (The Definition of Chalcedon) 
The Definition says there was integrity of the two natures in the Incarnation while explaining the 
unity of the natures as a union in one “person.”  It suggests three conditions of orthodox 
Christology: 
1. Christ was fully divine. 
2. Christ was fully human. 
3. Christ had two natures in one person. 
For the Definition and an explanation of it, see Documents of the Christian Church, ed. Henry 
Bettenson and Chris Maunder (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 56, and Linwood 
Urban, A Short History of Christian Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 76 and 
93.   
5 Cf. Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 121. 
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must have been a totally different being.  That is, HSV must say that Christ was merely a human 
being, not a divine being, since a human soul cannot essentially be divine.  By losing divinity of 
his original soul, he lost the divine attributes he had before the Incarnation.6  Thus, although HSV 
seems successful in explaining Jesus’ real suffering, it has a trouble with the issue of Christ’s 
divinity. 
So the dualist Christology has a dilemma.  If it says that God the Son was incarnated by 
becoming a human soul (HSV), then it cannot explain his divinity.  But if it says that he was a 
divine soul (DSV), it must admit that he was not fully human so he could not experience any 
pain. 
A Physicalist View of the Passion of the Christ 
 If dualism is not successful, we need to seriously consider physicalism.  Physicalism in 
this paper is about metaphysics of the human person.  The basic idea of the theory, as some 
philosophers have recently argued, is that a human person just is his body.7  That is, he is 
identical with a living human organism.  An important advantage of physicalism is that it can 
avoid an absurd consequence of a human person.  F r example, if I am not identical with my 
body, it seems that I coincide with something distinct (my body) from myself.  That is, there are 
two distinct objects that occupy exactly the same region of space at the same time.  But this 
appears absurd.  If I am numerically identical with my body, there is no such absurdity.  
Similarly, I am the subject of certain mental states, and the physicalist says that my whole body is 
                                                            
6 So HSV naturally leads to the kenosis theory, according to which when God the Son became 
incarnated he lost some of his divine properties such as omnipotence and omniscience.  I will 
discuss the theory in the final section.   
7 I adopted ‘physicalism’ in Peter van Inwagen, Metaphysics, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 
2002), Chapter 10.  Trenton Merricks uses the same terminology in “The Word Made Flesh: 
Dualism, Physicalism, and the Incarnation,” in Persons: Human and Divine, eds. Peter Van 
Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).  Eric Olson uses a 
different term, ‘animalism’ for the same view in his The Human Animal (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997).  
 32
that subject in virtue of its brain and nervous system.  But if I am not my whole body, then it 
appears that there are two distinct objects that have the same thoughts and feelings.  This seems 
absurd too.  This absurdity can be avoided by maintaining that I am my body.8
It is worth noting that although physicalism of the human person says that a person does 
not have a soul as a substantial part, it is consistet with the view that all the properties a human 
person has are not physical properties in that his mental properties are sui generis.  I believe that 
although certain atoms of my brain play a role in producing thoughts, my thoughts are not 
reducible to those atoms.  There are at least two reasons for this belief.  First, one simple, unified 
state or act, like thinking, cannot be divisible into lots of physical parts; thinking cannot just be 
many nonthinking atoms.  Further, there is an explanatory gap between mental properties and 
physical properties; the truth of the sentence ‘I f el pain’ is not guaranteed by the sentence ‘C-
fibers fire.’9  So we cannot account for the act of thought in terms of the activities of parts of the 
brain.  Obviously, physicalism of the human person is not incompatible with these two ideas.  It 
does not say that mental properties are merely physical things.  Rather physicalism can imply that 
although atoms of the brain jointly produce a simple and unified act of thought, the mental 
                                                            
8 I assume that coincidence of two objects is not possible.  But some philosophers argue that it is 
possible that there are two distinct objects at the same region of space at the same time, and one is 
composed or constituted by the other one.  On this view, a human person is not identical with his 
body, and the former is coincident with the latter; he is constituted by his body.  For the defense 
of the so-called colocationism or the constitution view, see Lynne Baker, Persons and Bodies: A 
Constitution View (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), and E. J. Lowe, Subjects of 
Experience (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), chapter 2.  For a critique of the 
constitution view in philosophy of religion, see D an Zimmerman, “Christians Should Affirm 
Mind-Body Dualism,” in Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Michael 
Peterson and Raymond VanArragon (Malden: Blackwell, 2003).  I think that colocationism 
cannot explain the passion of Christ for following reason.  According to the theory, a human 
person is not identical with his body but something distinct from it.  Now suppose that someone 
pinched Christ.  Colocationists must say that the two objects, that is, Christ the person and his 
body, were pinched by someone.  But if Christ was something distinct from his body, then he 
could not feel pain when he was pinched.  This is not biblical.  If colocationists reply that Christ 
felt pain because his body was pinched, this admits that Christ was identical with his body, but 
this is what colocationism rejects.   
 
9 For the explanatory gap argument, see Joseph Levine, “Materialism and Qualia,” Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly 64 (1986): 354-361. 
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property is not reducible to the nonthinking parts.  Thus, physicalism does not necessarily imply 
type-type identity or logical supervenience or any other reductionist idea.  So on the physicalist 
view, a human person is a living organism having irreducible mental properties. 
 The doctrine of the Incarnation can be explained in terms of physicalism of the human 
person.  On this view, that God the Son became  human being means that he became a living 
human organism having sui generis mental properties.  Of course, this does not mean that Christ 
was merely a human being.  Necessarily, if Jesus was God the Son, he was God the Son even 
after he was incarnated.  Then it is logically possible that although he became a material object 
like a living organism, he did have essential properties as God the Son.  That is, he possessed 
properties that make him God the Son in this world (I will argue for this in more detail in the next 
section).  It is hard to enumerate every essential property of God the Son, and this is not a main 
topic of this paper.  We can simply think of some representative properties of God such as 
omnipotence and omniscience.  Since Jesus was God the Son, he had properties of omnipotence 
and omniscience.  Thus, in this actual world where he was walking and living almost 2000 years 
ago, he still was God the Son because of those essential properties, although he did not have an 
immaterial part.10  So the physicalist Christology explains two natures in one person.  Christ was 
fully divine because he possessed essential properties as God the Son.  He also was fully human 
because he was a living human organism.   
Moreover, the physicalist Christology provides a more plausible view of Jesus’ real 
suffering and death than dualism.  As we have discussed above, dualism has a dilemma regarding 
Christ’s suffering and death.  But the physicalist view does not have such a problem.  On this 
view, Christ was feeling pain when his body was hurt.  He died when biological functions of his 
                                                            
10 Obviously, being immaterial is not an essential property of God the Son, although it may be 
essential to God the Father and God the Spirit.  God the Son certainly had physical properties so 
he was not purely immaterial in this world. 
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body ceased to work.  Since he and his body are one and the same thing, it is to be said that 
anything true of him is true of that body.   
 In my view, the physicalist view of the passion of the Christ is contrasted to dualism the 
most in the following sense.  Dualism must say that Christ could not die, since he was a soul that 
cannot essentially die.  So dualists must say that God the Son cannot die.  On the other hand, 
physicalism accepts that he can.  If Jesus’ suffering and death were real, and that he was God the 
Son, then given physicalism, the incarnate God suffered and died.  This idea could be shocking to 
some Christians, but this is a logical onclusion of the identity statement (Jesus is God the Son), 
and what the Bible tells us.11  The dualist view, whether it is HSV or DSV, cannot capture that 
idea, since it must say that God the Son was alive even after the Crucifixion.  Thus, given 
dualism, it is very hard to make sense of the death of God the Son.  Moreover, if God the Son 
were alive after the Crucifixion, it would be hard to see why his resurrection is very important.  
For the resurrection in the Bible and Christian tradition means the resurrection of the dead body. 
12  But if Christ is identical with his body, this shows why the resurrection is a big deal.  All 
things considered, physicalism is philosophically and theologically more plausible than dualism.13 
                                                            
11 Some could claim that it is hard to understand God the Son died, since he was a divine being, 
that is, God.  So physicalism, according to them, is wrong.  I agree that God as the divine spirit 
cannot die.  However, this does not apply to Christ.  Again, by assumption he was fully human 
and fully divine.  Because of his full humanity, it was possible that he died.  Certainly, he was a 
divine being, but he was not a spirit after the Incarnation.  So we should not say that the divine 
spirit was crucified and died.  Rather we should say that a divine being who became a human 
person physically suffered and died. 
12 i.e., The Apostle’s Creed says “I believe in the resurrection of the body.”  Similarly, the Nicene 
Creed says “I look for the resurrection of the dead.” 
13 My view is consistent with Martin Luther’s “theology of the cross,” according to which “Christ 
is God and a human being in one person because whatever is said about him as a human being 
must also be said of him as God, namely, “Christ has died,” and, as Christ is God, it follows that 
“God has died” – not God in isolation, but God united with humanity.”  Cited from The Christian 
Theology Reader, 2nd ed. Ed., Alister McGrath (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001), 281.  Tertullian, 
an early Church Father, held that everything, cluding God and the human soul, is corporeal.  
See Raymond Martin and John Barresi, “Introduction,” in Personal Identity, ed. Martin and John 
Barresi (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), 12.  If this is right, when Jesus died, his human soul died 
too.  By appealing to this idea, HSV could explain Christ’s death.  But I think this kind of 
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Objection and Reply  
Objection: Suppose for reductio that the physicalist view of the passion of the Christ is 
true.  On the physicalist view, a human person is identical with his body, and he does not have a 
substantial soul.  If so, God the Son became a human being by being identical with a human 
organism.  He did not have a substantial soul.  Now that he was fully human by becoming a 
human body, he must have possessed essential properties of human beings.  Then he must have 
been mortal; for every physical body (a human person given physicalism) essentially is mortal.  
Besides, material objects cannot be omnipotent or omniscient so Jesus must have lacked such 
divine properties.  If so, we have a strange idea that God the Son was mortal, and that he was not 
omnipotent and omniscient.  So the physicalist Christology is wrong according to traditional 
Christian theism. 
 
Reply: The assumption of this objection is that a living organism cannot have divine 
attributes, since being physical and being divine are contradictory.  This assumption, however, is 
misleading.  It is similar to a Platonic view, according to which something spiritual is good and 
something physical is evil and corrupted, so the Holy God cannot become a human body.  I do 
not want to buy such a Platonic view, because it is not biblical (The Bible does not say that 
something physical is essentially bad.  Note thatGod created the physical world and said that it 
was good).  In a similar vein, I want to argue that it is not unbiblical and logically impossible that 
a material object like a human person has divine attributes.  But this applies only to Christ, 
because before the Incarnation, he already was God the Son; God cannot lose his divinity since he 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
dualism is radical and not a dualist view in a traditional sense.  I am not sure how dualists can 
explain that a soul is corporeal. 
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is essentially divine.14  Thus, even though he became a human organism, this does not necessarily 
imply that he lost his divinity.  It is worth noting that the Incarnation was an addition of human 
attributes to God the Son.  So he was fully divine as well as fully human even though he was 
incarnated by becoming a human organism.15 
I want to say more about the objection.  Was Christ, a living human organism, 
omnipotent, omniscient and immortal for the period of the Incarnation?  This question is two-
fold.  If the question asks whether he was always omnipotent and omniscient, and mortal, the 
answer is ‘no.’  Obviously, the Bible tells us that Jesus was sometimes not omnipotent, 
omniscient, and immortal (God the Son died on the cross, and as we have discussed above, 
physicalism does say that).  But if the question asks whether he was essentially omnipotent, 
omniscient, and immortal even for the period of the Incarnation, I would answer, ‘yes.’  Even 
though Jesus was not always omnipotent, omniscient, and immortal, it does not follow, as I shall 
explain below, that he lost such properties that are essential to God.16 
                                                            
14 Another reply says that that lacking maximal power or maximal knowledge is not an essential 
property to be a human being, although it iscommon to all human beings.  Being common does 
not imply being essential.  That is, it is possible that a human being is omnipotent and omniscient.  
This is very attractive but not successful.  For a human being is necessarily a creature in every 
possible world he exists, and then he is not powerful to create himself.  For the strategy, see 
Thomas Senor, “The Incarnation and the Trinity,” in Reason for the Hope Within, ed., Michael 
Murray (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 248-249.   
15 HSV cannot say the same thing.  On HSV, a human person is essentially a human soul, and 
God the Son became a human person by becoming a human soul.  But a human soul is essentially 
a human soul so it is necessary that it cannot be divine.  But in the case of God the Son’s 
becoming a material object like a living human organism, there is no reason to think that such a 
being cannot essentially be divine or loses his divinity.  Physicality, unlike having a property of 
being a human soul, is neutral with being divine and being not-divine, so it is possible that the 
property does not hurt God the Son’s divinity. 
16 Some philosophers suggest the “two minds view,” according to which Christ had two minds, 
one divine and one human.  It says that the divine mind is omniscient, whereas the human mind is 
not.  The divine mind is omnipotent while the human mind is not.  But I am not convinced by this 
theory for the reason of a schizophrenic Jesus.  It i  hard to understand the existence of two 
consciousnesses in one person.  Besides, it is unclear how a mind is omnipotent.  But for a 
defense of the “two minds view” of the Incarnation, see Thomas Morris, The Logic of God 
Incarnate (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), chapter 6. 
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I believe that even though God the Son became  material object, he still had properties 
essential to God.  This, some could say, is contradictory to the view that God the Son did not 
know some truth (i.e., the hour of his return) and that he physically suffered and died.  How can 
we solve the contradiction?  Some could argue that to solve the problem, physicalism should be 
connected to the kenosis theory, according to which God the Son abandoned some of his divine 
properties in order to become incarnated (Philippians 2:6-7).  For example, when he became a 
living human organism, he laid aside omnipotence and omniscience while his moral properties 
(i.e. love and mercy) were maintained.  But I am not convinced by the kenosis theory for a simple 
reason.  If God is essentially omnipotent and omniscient, then he would not be divine any more if 
he did not have such divine properties.  God cannot give up his divine properties that he 
essentially has.  If God is necessarily omnipotent and omniscient, it is impossible that God does 
not have such properties in any possible world.  Thus, the kenosis theory is wrong.17  Again, the 
Incarnation was not a subtraction from his divine natures but an addition of human natures.   
If the kenosis theory is wrong, how should the physicalist understand his divine 
attributes during his earthly life?  For example, if Christ was essentially omnipotent, how could 
he not avoid his suffering and death?  I think his omnipotence does not imply that he could do 
whatever he wanted to do during the period of the Incarnation.  Note that he was fully human.  
Physicalists must admit that since he took on human natures, he had limitations on functioning 
omnipotence.  But such limitations did not result from the loss of omnipotence.  Rather he 
voluntarily decided not to use all of his power by taking on some human natures.  Thus, the 
limitation was not a result of the loss of his divinity.  Think about this analogy.  Suppose that 
Tiger Woods, the world’s greatest golfer, voluntarily covers up one of his eyes and plays a golf 
                                                            
17 Some theologians argue that the kenosis theory is based on a wrong interpretation of 
Philippians 2:6-7.  They say that what God the Son emptied himself of was not divine properties 
but the glory he had as God.  This interpretation claims that Jesus emptied himself in order to 
become functionally subordinated to the Father for the period of Incarnation.  See Millard 
Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1998), 751. 
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game.  In that situation, he cannot fully perform his great golf skill since he had a limitation on 
his ability.  But it is hard to say that his ability s in essence diminished in that situation.  
Similarly, so long as God the Son voluntarily limited his power by taking some physical natures, 
it does not follow that his omnipotence was not in essence surrendered.  Of course, Jesus 
sometimes used his power for some reason (i.e. to show his divine Sonship).  Obviously, he could 
have avoided his suffering and death because he was omnipotent (as he told Paul) but he did not 
choose to avoid them.  The problem of omniscience can be understood in the light of this idea 
too. 
Likewise, the Incarnate Word was essentially immortal.  The divine property of being 
immortal was not displaced by the property of being mortal.  So it was possible that he became 
immortal in this world.  But he voluntarily chose to die.  He voluntarily accepted human mortality 
for some reason.  But this does not imply that the property of being immortal was divested when 
he became incarnated.   
In conclusion, although physicalism does say that God the Son died on the cross, it does 
not say that he died just because he abandoned some of his divine natures when he was 
incarnated.  Rather it says that he still had all the divine properties during his period on earth and 
even on the cross, but he suffered and died because he rendered himself vulnerable to physical 
pains.∗   
  







∗ Thanks to the audience at the Midwest Philosophy and Theology Conference at Lincoln 
University. 
